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International surrogacy agreements involve a child born to a surrogate mother who is of a
different nationality to the commissioning parent(s) in a state other than that of which the
commissioning parent(s) are nationals or reside. Many of these arrangements lead to
children being born stateless, which deprives that child of many rights that are directly
linked to one’s nationality as well as causing significant practical problems, such as
difficulty in obtaining a passport. In undertaking the first Public International Law analysis
of nationality and international surrogacy agreements, we map out how various provisions
can be used to guarantee protections against statelessness. Accordingly, we argue that the
drafting of a proposed new convention is not the ideal solution in this respect, and should
not be to the detriment of the ratification and implementation of the relevant conventions
that we identify; in particular, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. We argue that
these protections offer the most meaningful protection in the short term and should be used
to inform any future protections under the proposed Convention. We conclude by
encouraging the advancement of Public International Law arguments when petitioning in
a domestic context on behalf of stateless international surrogate children.
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INTRODUCTION
International surrogacy agreements pose complex challenges for the states involved.
These include the question of what should be the nationality of children born following
international surrogacy agreements (hereafter ‘international surrogate children’), upon
which this paper focuses. Take the example of a child born to a surrogate in state A,
whose intended parent(s) are from state B – how is the nationality of such a child
determined?1 As this paper explains, this question is often tied to who states A and
* [First author] BCL (Int) (NUI); LLM (Leiden); DPhil (Oxford). [Second author] BCL (NUI);
LLM (NUI), PhD (Edinburgh). The authors would like to thank Professor Tamara Hervey and
Dr James Upcher for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this piece. All errors and
omissions remain the authors’ own.
1. Commissioning parent(s) refers to the person(s) who have asked the surrogate to carry a child
for them, with the intention that the child will be handed over after birth to their care and will be
raised by the commissioning parent(s).
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B recognise as the legal parent(s). However, questions of nationality of international
surrogate children are complicated by: (i) differences in domestic provisions governing
the legal parenthood of children; (ii) the absence of any overarching international
framework in terms of legal parenthood; and (iii) disparities between national states
on the legality of surrogacy and, in particular, the legality of commercial surrogacy.
Moreover, complications are exacerbated where more than two states are involved;
for instance, if the intended parent(s) are nationals of state C but reside in state D and
propose to return and raise the child in state D; or where a donor egg and/or donor sperm
from a national of another state is used in the creation of an embryo, which is then im-
planted in the surrogate. The second scenario can pose difficulties in states where na-
tionality or legal parenthood is tied to biological links, as this means that the child
may have no biological link with the intended parent(s), and may instead have a biolog-
ical link with a third-party national.
Furthermore, given that many rights and responsibilities flow from the state to its na-
tionals and this entails an economic burden for the state, states are often reluctant to rec-
ognise international surrogate children as their nationals. As a consequence,
international surrogate children can be rendered stateless; that is, persons ‘who [are]
not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law’.2 The stateless
person has been referred to as ‘flotsam, a res nullius’, and has been compared to ‘a ves-
sel on the open sea, not sailing under any flag’.3 This is because nationality entitles in-
dividuals to the diplomatic protection of a state and since many civil, political and social
rights (eg the right to vote, and the rights to education, medical care etc.) are directly
linked to one’s nationality, children born stateless are denied such protections and fun-
damental rights.4 Being born stateless creates significant problems immediately from
birth, such as the inability to receive a passport, and imposing a continued status of
statelessness on anyone, especially a child, is entirely unsatisfactory. It amounts to a
failure in fundamental rights protection for such children, as their human rights often
cannot be vindicated because their rights are not opposable to any particular state. Fur-
thermore, nationality has been conceived of as part of one’s identity, which falls under
one’s right to a private and family life,5 which is also flouted in such cases.
This paper illustrates the relatively untapped potential of Public International Law to
determine which state, if any, has the obligation to grant nationality to international sur-
rogate children who would otherwise be stateless. This examination contributes to the
existing debate on international surrogacy agreements and statelessness by taking two
novel approaches. First, this paper examines international surrogacy agreements
through a deliberately pragmatic perspective, taking as its starting point the reality that
international surrogacy agreements are occurring globally and increasing in rate, and
that regardless of the ethical issues surrounding such agreements, all children have
the right to a nationality. Consequently, an examination of the ethical questions that sur-
round the existence and operation of international surrogacy arrangements is beyond
the scope of this paper, aside from a brief reference to put this discussion in context.
Secondly, this paper represents the first legal analysis of nationality and international
2. 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 360 UNTS 117, Art 1(1).
3. P Weis ‘The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961’ (1962) 11
(4) Int’l & Comp L Q 1073.
4. Ibid.
5. Mennesson v France, application no 65192/11, 26 June 2014; Labassee v France, applica-
tion no 65941/11, 26 June 2014
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surrogacy agreements through a Public International Law lens. Much of the literature
surrounding international surrogacy agreements has focused on the Private Interna-
tional issues – which, for the reasons outlined in the fourth section of this paper, is
not necessarily the best or indeed the only way to provide protection to international
surrogate children. We encourage persons petitioning on behalf of stateless children
to advance the arguments rooted in Public International Law contained in this paper,
as such arguments tend not to be made at present.
This paper also contributes to debates surrounding transnational/international repro-
ductive services. Surrogacy represents a useful case study for exploring the challenges
relating to the governance of transnational reproductive ‘tourism’, where individuals
trying to evade restrictions in their state of origin – or high costs – travel to states with
more permissive regulatory frameworks. The desirability of surrogacy arrangements is
contested. The main objections include claims that it leads to exploitation;6 that free
consent is impossible to obtain7 ; and that it involves the commodification of children.8
On the contrary, others argue that surrogacy empowers women to support themselves;
and/or that it supports the recognition/creation of differing family forms, particularly
same-sex or single-parent families.9 Accordingly, a fragmented patchwork of differing
national regulatory responses is evident. Moreover, states with laws restricting surro-
gacy are often reluctant to recognise international agreements.10 More generally, many
states only recognise legal parentage, subject to specific conditions – for example, only
for heterosexual married intended parents; or if there is a biological connection between
the intended parent(s) and child, leading to ‘fragmentation of parentage into genetic,
gestational, and intentional components’.11 We argue that the human rights of the child
must prevail and must be prioritised over national public policy concerns seeking to
prohibit/limit surrogacy. More broadly, this research contributes to the debates
concerning areas where the law has difficulty accommodating rapid developments in
technology.12 In particular, this paper’s purposive approach to treaty interpretation
could by analogy inform interpretations of the law pertaining to cyberwarfare, disease
control, outer space and the use of drones.
6. See S Allan ‘The surrogate in commercial surrogacy’ in P Greber and K O’Byrne (eds) Sur-
rogacy, Law and Human Rights (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015).
7. Ibid, pp 126–130.
8. G Corea The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to
Artifical Wombs (New York: Harper and Row, 1985) p 219; JG RaymondWomen as Wombs: Re-
productive Technologies and the Battle over Women’s Freedom (San Francisco, CA:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1993) p 57.
9. MM Shultz ‘Reproductive technology and intent based parenthood: an opportunity for gen-
der neutrality’ (1990) Wis L Rev 297; JA Robertson Children of Choice: Freedom and the New
Reproductive Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) p 131.
10. A Stumcke ‘Extra-territoriality and surrogacy: the problem of state and territory moral sov-
ereignty’ in Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 6.
11. RF Sturrow ‘Surrogacy: American style’ in Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 6, p 209.
12. See egMajor AJ Schaap ‘Cyber warfare operations: development and use under international
law’ (2009) 64(1) Air Force L Rev 121; B Cheng ‘United Nations resolutions on outer space: “in-
stant” international customary law?’ (1965) 5 Ind J Int’l L 23; MMcNab and MMatthews ‘Clar-
ifying the law relating to unmanned drones and the use of force: the relationships between human
rights, self-defense, armed conflict, and international humanitarian law’ (2011) 39(4) Denv J
Int’l L & Pol’y 661; DP Fidler ‘SARS and international law’ (2003) 8(7) ASIL Insights, available
at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/7/sars-and-international-law (accessed 18 Febru-
ary 2016).
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The first section of this paper commences by outlining the scope of the problem. It
provides an overview of the current context of international surrogacy agreements,
how statelessness occurs and how domestic courts have dealt with such issues. In light
of the problems identified with being born stateless, as discussed in the second section,
the third section of this paper argues that although there are some legal provisions that
regulate this area – such as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) – protection gaps
nonetheless remain. The proposed Surrogacy Convention by the Hague Conference on
International Law seeks to address these gaps. However, the drafters of this Convention
are likely to encounter significant difficulties, with the result that it is likely to take years
if not decades to finalise this Convention and it is unlikely to be ratified by those states
that prohibit surrogacy arrangements. As a result, we argue that the ratification and im-
plementation in domestic law of existing Public International Law conventions provid-
ing protection for stateless children should be given priority, as this approach offers the
most meaningful solution for such children in the short term. Moreover, these existing
protections should be used to inform any future protections for surrogate children
against statelessness under the proposed Convention.
1. INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS: THE CURRENT
LANDSCAPE
Surrogacy involves a scenario where a woman (the surrogate) agrees to become preg-
nant and carry a child for another couple or individual, the intended parent(s), with the
intention that after birth this child is given to the intended parent(s) to raise. This is
achieved either by artificial insemination – traditional surrogacy – where the surrogate
is inseminated with donor/intended parent’s sperm and she has a biological link with the
child; or gestational surrogacy, where IVF is used to implant an embryo created using
the intended parent(s) gametes/and/or donor gametes in the surrogacy, who will not
have a biological link with the child. This highlights the differences in genetic links
amongst the surrogate/intended parent(s) and the child, which may arise in the context
of surrogacy agreements. This biological relationship may be relevant in the context of
a discussion of statelessness, as some states factor this into the consideration of legal
parenthood and/or nationality.
There is no international legal framework applicable to surrogacy, and the national
regulatory responses also differ. Generally, states will fall into one of the following four
broad categories: (i) the practice is unregulated, which means that it operates in a legal
vacuum; (ii) states adopt a permissive approach where surrogacy is legal but unenforce-
able, and distinctions may be drawn between the legality of commercial and altruistic
surrogacy;13 (iii) states adopt a permissive approach where contracts are enforceable
(again, a distinction may be drawn between commercial and altruistic surrogacy); or
(iv) all forms of surrogacy are prohibited. These differing approaches are relevant in
the context of nationality questions, as statelessness may arise for international surro-
gate children for two main reasons: (i) due to conflict of laws relating to questions of
nationality and parenthood, where different approaches apply in the state where the
child is born and the state of which the intended parent(s) is/are (a) national/s of, or
to which s/he/they wish(es) to return, leading to difficulties in establishing the nation-
ality of the child; and (ii) if international surrogacy agreements are illegal in the
13. In some jurisdictions, altruistic surrogacy is legal but commercial surrogacy is prohibited.
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intended parent(s) state, that state may be reluctant to recognise the legal effects of sur-
rogacy carried out abroad – and thus the link between the intended parent(s) and the
child – and therefore it is difficult to establish nationality.14
Notwithstanding the dearth of international guidance on this area, the Hague
Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) has recognised that international
surrogacy agreements are growing at a rapid pace.15 While the HCCH acknowledged
the difficulties surrounding accurate reporting of international surrogacy agreements,16
it highlighted that there was evidence from a study by Aberdeen University of a
‘tremendous growth in the “market”’ with an increase of nearly 1,000% in the number
of documented arrangements when it examined data from five agencies specialising in
international surrogacy from 2006 to 2010.17
International surrogacy is also an area that is global in reach, with intended couples/
individuals travelling from all regions of the world. The range of states to which such
couples/individuals travel for international surrogacy agreements is diverse, although
the more popular regions to which couples/individuals travel are North America, East-
ern Europe and Asia.18 Having said this, there have been recent changes to the laws in
states, including Thailand and India19 – previously popular ‘destination’ states for inter-
national surrogacy – which now ban foreigners availing of surrogacy services in these
states. Instead of halting the practice of overseas surrogacy, such agreements may be
driven underground,20 and should foreign intended parent(s) continue to obtain
14. See generally, Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), Permanent Bureau
Private International Law Issues Surrounding the Status of Children, Including Issues Arising
from International Surrogacy Arrangements (March 2011), available at http://www.hcch.net/up-
load/wop/genaff2011pd11e.pdf (accessed 11 February 2016).
15. Hague Conference on Private International Law A Preliminary Report on Issues arising
from International Surrogacy (March 2012), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
gap2012pd10en.pdf, para. 2 (accessed 11 February 2016). It has also been recognised that surro-
gacy is increasing within the EU: see EU Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs A Comparative
Study on the Regime of Surrogacy in EUMember States (2013), available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474403/IPOL-JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf
(accessed 11 February 2016) para 5.1.
16. Ibid, para 6.
17. Ibid.
18. More than two states may be involved, as noted, eg if donor gamete(s) from a third jurisdic-
tion is used. Ibid.
19. See Government of India Ministry for Home Affairs, Circular No 462 ‘Foreign Nationals
including Overseas Citizens of India (OCI) cardholders] seeking to visit India for commissioning
surrogacy’ (3 November 2015), which directed that India Missions/Posts/FRROs/FROs were to
ensure that no visas would be issued to foreign nationals or permissions granted to OCIs to com-
mission surrogacy in India. It also directed that no exit permission be given to children born
through surrogacy in India to foreign nationals, including OCI cardholders. However, in cases
of children born through surrogacy already commissioned before the circular was issued, exit
permission would be decided on a case-by-case basis by FRROs/FROs. This information is based
on the position at the time of writing (21 June 2016). Nepal introduced a similar ban on surrogacy,
which included a ban for foreign nationals or arrangements initiated outside Nepal, on 18 Septem-
ber 2015; see http://nepal.usembassy.gov/service/surrogacy-in-nepal.html (accessed 11 February
2016).
20. It has been argued that a global ban on commercial surrogacy would probably result in a
black market for surrogacy, which could increase the potential for exploitation. See K Trimmings
and P Beaumont International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International
Level (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) p 442.
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surrogacy services in India/Thailand, ignoring these rules, this will create further diffi-
culties in terms of nationality for any children born, who would be unable to leave the
jurisdiction. These developments are most likely to result in overseas couples going to
other more liberal or less regulated jurisdictions for surrogacy services. Indeed, it has
been reported that, since these changes, surrogacy has been increasing in
Cambodia.21 In effect, the problems for nationality/statelessness in international surro-
gacy agreements are merely moved, becoming issues involving different jurisdictions
than before.
2. INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS AND THE POTENTIAL
FOR STATELESSNESS
Two principles are crucial in terms of determining the nationality of a child at birth;
namely, jus soli and jus sanguinis. Under jus soli, or ‘the right of the soil’, children ac-
quire the nationality of the territory in which they are born. Some states may also adopt
limited or conditional jus soli provisions; for instance, based on a residency period.22
On the other hand, jus sanguinis, meaning ‘right of the blood’, is where nationality is
not determined by birth but by having parents or ancestors who are nationals of that
state. If the state where the child is born operates under an absolute jus soli principle,
the child will be a national of that state once born, and so will not be stateless. However,
if the state where the child is born operates a jus sanguinis approach, then the child’s
nationality is precarious, and will be dependent on who is recognised as a ‘parent’.
Problems arise if the state of the intended parents, state B, operates under jus sanguinis
but differs in its rules in terms of how parentage is decided by state A.23 For instance, if
a child is born in state A, which recognises the intended parents, who are from state B,
as the legal parents, state A will consider that the child should be a national of state B.
However, if state B views the surrogate and her husband as the legal parents, it will con-
sider the child a national of state A. As neither state’s law can be imposed on the other,
the result is that a child born through surrogacy in state A could be left stranded in state
A with uncertain legal parentage,24 and without nationality of either jurisdiction; that
is, stateless. Difficulties may also arise if the state in which the child is born operates
a conditional jus soli framework including residency requirements that, by definition,
a newborn child would not meet.
The difficulties that arise because of conflicting legal frameworks for parenthood are
illustrated by the 2008 case of Re: X& Y (Foreign Surrogacy), before the High Court of
England and Wales.25 This involved British intended parents who entered into an in-
ternational surrogacy agreement with a married Ukrainian woman. The surrogate was
implanted with an embryo created using donor eggs and the intended father’s sperm
and gave birth to twins. The agreement remained amicable; however, in the UK, the Hu-
man Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) provides that the surrogate is always
21. M Cook ‘Surrogacy business shifts to Cambodia’ Bioedge 7 November 2015; V Muong
and W Jackson ‘Three million dollar babies’ Phnom Penh Post 2 January 2016.
22. See C Becker ‘Jus soli: a miraculous solution to prevent statelessness?’(9 April 2015),
available at http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/jus-soli-miraculous-solution-prevent-statelessness
(accessed 11 February 2016).
23. GL Cohen Patients with Passports, Medical Tourism, Law and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014) p 403.
24. Hague Conference, above n 14, p 9.
25. [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam).
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considered the legal mother of the child.26 Moreover, as the Ukrainian surrogate was
married, under the HFEA her husband, having known and consented to the treatment,
was presumed to be the legal father of the child.27 This is despite the fact that the
intended father was the children’s biological father.28 However, in the Ukraine, the
intended parents were seen as the children’s legal parents. As Hedley J noted, ‘the chil-
dren had no rights of residence in or nationality of the Ukraine and there was no obli-
gation owed them by the state other than to accommodate them as an act of basic
humanity in a state orphanage’.29 Instead, the children were ‘marooned stateless and
parentless whilst the applicants could neither remain in the Ukraine nor bring the chil-
dren home’.30
Nonetheless, a temporary solution was found. Following the submission of DNA ev-
idence proving that the intended father was the biological parent of the children, discre-
tionary leave was provided for the children to enter the UK. This was aimed at allowing
the children’s status to be regularised by applying for a parental order that would make
the intended parents their legal parents,31 as a result of which they could then seek UK
nationality for the children under the British Nationality Act 1981.32 The parental order
that was the subject of these proceedings was subsequently granted.
The case of Baby Manji involved an Indian surrogate and Japanese intended parents.
An embryo was created using the intended father’s sperm and an anonymous donor’s
egg, which was implanted in the surrogate, resulting in the birth of a baby girl. How-
ever, the intended parents’ relationship broke down and the intended mother refused
to participate in the surrogacy agreement.33 When the child was born, the intended fa-
ther sought to bring the child to Japan, but his application for a Japanese passport for the
child was unsuccessful, as under Japanese law nationality was determined on the basis
of the nationality of the birth mother; that is, in this case the surrogate, who was
Indian.34 His application for adoption was also unsuccessful, as Indian law at the time
prohibited the adoption of a female child by a single man. He then applied for an Indian
passport for the baby. In order to obtain this, a birth certificate was required, and while
under Indian law the intended father could be named on the certificate, it was unclear
26. Section 33 HFEA 2008, For discussion, see UK Visas and Immigration, Surrogacy (June
2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/258243/surrogacy.pdf (accessed 11 February 2016). For the definition of parent for national-
ity purposes, see British Nationality (Proof of Paternity) Regulations 2006; see generally, UK
Border Agency Inter-Country Surrogacy and Immigration Rules, available at https://www.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261435/Intercountry-surrogacy-
leaflet.pdf (accessed 11 February 2016) para 34.
27. Section 28 HFEA, 1990; s 38 HFEA 2008.
28. [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam), paras 5–6.
29. Ibid, para 8.
30. Ibid, para 10.
31. Section 54 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008. This allows for the transfer of
legal parentage in cases of surrogacy subject to a number of conditions in the UK context, and
avoids couples having to apply to adopt a child, which was happening previously.
32. Section 1(5) British Nationality Act 1981. Since 2010, if a parental order is granted a sur-
rogate child automatically becomes a British national, but this would not have been automatic at
the time of the case.
33. Trimmings and Beaumont, above n 20, p 508.
34. CKindregan and DWhite ‘International fertility tourism: the potential for stateless children
in cross-border commercial surrogacy arrangements’ (2013) Suffolk Transnat’l L Rev 527–626 at
548.
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who the legal mother was; namely, whether it was the surrogate or the intended mother,
who did not wish to be part of the arrangement. Therefore, the birth certificate was
refused.
Eventually, the Indian passport office issued an identity certificate, a legal document
issued to those who cannot get a passport in their discretionary solution, valid only for
the baby to travel to Japan. Subsequently, the child was issued with a Japanese visa on
humanitarian grounds, on which again no reference was made to the child’s nationality.
Once the child was in Japan, the Japanese authorities agreed that the baby could become
a Japanese citizen subject to proof of the parent–child relationship.
As can be seen, the diplomatic and/or discretionary ‘solutions’ adopted to resolve
these cases are fraught with uncertainties for intended parents and surrogate-born chil-
dren. They are also often ad hoc in nature, can take considerable time to arrange, can be
expensive and can require the intended parents to stay for a considerable period of time
in state Awith the child(ren). Moreover, these are often temporary solutions provided to
allow the child to travel to state B with the intended parents, but (most importantly for
the purposes of this paper) they do not necessarily resolve the nationality status of the
child, which may involve further processes after the child is in state B. These ‘solutions’
are also of little practical benefit to children abandoned by intended parents following
an international surrogacy agreement, who are left in a highly precarious position under
this current framework, as in many cases the temporary solutions described must be pe-
titioned for through the legal system in either/both states. Without the intended par-
ent(s) involved, it is questionable who will apply for such rights on behalf of the
surrogate child. Moreover, even if the child has a surrogate willing to petition on his/
her behalf, the reality is that the surrogate may not have the resources or means to access
the legal services necessary to do so.35 Furthermore, as it is the child’s nationality that
is at issue in such cases, there is no recognisable state that will step in for their
protection.
For these reasons, we argue that the current framework surrounding the nationality of
surrogate children does not sufficiently safeguard children against statelessness. Re-
course to Public International Law is warranted as, although it has its limitations, it
nonetheless goes some way towards safeguarding human rights for such children.
3. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF STATELESS CHILDREN BORN
UNDER INTERNATIONAL SURROGACY AGREEMENTS
The literature on international surrogacy agreements has taken a Private International
Law approach,36 which implies complete state sovereignty over nationality. The key
argument we are making is that existing provisions of Public International Law offer
protection to children born stateless as a result of international surrogacy agreements.
35. There will be exceptions to this, such as the case of Baby Gammy, whose Thai surrogate
decided to raise him after the commissioning parents refused to. Subsequently, she successfully
petitioned – amidst much international media coverage – on behalf of the child for Australian cit-
izenship See ‘Baby Gammy granted Australian citizenship’ BBCNews (20 January 2015), avail-
able at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-30892258 (accessed 11 February 2016).
36. Y Ergas ‘Babies without borders: human rights, human dignity, and the regulation of inter-
national commercial surrogacy’ (2013) 27 Emory Int’l L Rev 117; K Trimmings and P
Beaumount ‘International surrogacy arrangements: an urgent need for legal regulation at the in-
ternational level’ 7 J Private Int’l L 627; Trimmings and Beaumount, above n 20.
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In becoming parties to particular treaties, states have consented to be bound to certain
provisions that limit their powers in determining nationality. In the words of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights:
The classic doctrinal position, which viewed nationality as an attribute granted by the
state to its subjects, has gradually evolved to the point that nationality is today per-
ceived as involving the jurisdiction of the state as well as human rights issues.37
The default position in international law is that it is the sovereign right of every state to
determine under its own laws who are its nationals.38 Thus children born as a result of
international surrogacy agreements do not have a de facto right of nationality vis-à-vis
the state in which they were born. This position is a result of the traditional reluctance of
the international community to find practical solutions to the problem of statelessness.
However, since the First WorldWar, there have been developments in the prevention of
statelessness and in the protection of stateless persons. These developments are not spe-
cific to the context of international surrogacy agreements, as surrogacy as a practice was
not in existence until relatively recently.
The first international instrument referring to the problem of statelessness was the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).39 Article 15 proclaims that
‘[e]veryone has the right to a nationality’ and that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his nationality’. However, this article does not identify which state is obliged to grant
nationality, nor under what circumstances nationality should be granted. More impor-
tantly, the UDHR, as a General Assembly resolution, is not ipso facto legally binding.
Thus Art 15, while an indication of political will in this respect, does little in practical
terms to combat the problem of statelessness.40
However, an attempt was made to find solutions to the problem of statelessness in
1961, when the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS) was com-
pleted.41 Article 1 sets out the primary rule, which is that a Contracting State shall
grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless.
Articles 1(a) and (b) set out that such nationality shall be granted: ‘(a) At birth, by op-
eration of law, or; (b) Upon an application being lodged with the appropriate authority,
by or on behalf of the person concerned, in the manner prescribed by the national law.’
This provision seems quite straightforward in the context of the problem identified – a
37. Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica,
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, Inter-AmCt HR (Ser A) No 4 (1984), at [32]–[35].
38. NottebohmCase (second phase), Judgment of 6 April 1955, ICJ Reports 1955, p 4. See also
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law 179
LNTS 89; Art 1 provides that ‘it is for each state to determine under its own laws who are its na-
tionals. This shall be recognised by other states in so far as it is consistent with international con-
ventions, international custom, and the principles of international law generally recognised with
regard to nationality.’
39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A
(III).
40. See Weis, above n 3, at 1074–1075. An argument could be made that Art 15 is part of Cus-
tomary International Law. For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has referred
to Art 15 of the UDHR as supporting its conclusion that ‘[t]he right of every human being to a
nationality has been recognized as such by international law’. See Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84,
19 January 1984, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 4 (1984), at [33].
41. 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175.
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child born as a result of an international surrogacy agreement in a Contracting State is
entitled to the nationality of that state, if s/he would otherwise be stateless (ie if s/he
does not receive nationality on the basis of the jus soli or jus sanguinis principles as
outlined above).
Nonetheless, the provision suffers from significant procedural hurdles. Article 1 may
be subject to the condition that the child has been habitually resident in the Contracting
State for such period as may be fixed by that state, not exceeding 5years immediately
preceding the lodging of the application nor 10 years in total.42 Unless a state adopts a
0 days residency period, a child who has just been born will not fulfil residency require-
ments where such requirements are applicable, and thus not be entitled to nationality of
the state in which he/she was born. For those children, Art 4 provides a ‘safety net’ in
the sense that he/she would be entitled to the nationality of one of his/her parents, pro-
vided that one of his parents was from a Contracting State. This, once again, may be
subject to a residency period of up to 3 years preceding the lodging of the application
for nationality. However, a further significant problem that may arise is where the par-
ent(s) of the child do not lodge an application for nationality.43 This could happen
where the parent(s) decide they no longer want to raise the child. In such a case, it is
unclear whether the child would remain stateless and much would depend on who
was to become the guardian of the child.
Thus the general position under the CRS is that a child will be given the nationality of
the state in which s/he was born unless the child does not fulfil residency requirements
set out by that state (where applicable), in which case the child will be entitled to the
nationality of one of his/her parents. The exhaustive nature of the list of possible re-
quirements means that states cannot establish conditions for the grant of nationality ad-
ditional to those stipulated in the CRS. However, problems remain. First, similar to the
issues raised in the first half of this paper (where it was noted that difficulties in terms of
nationality often revolve around the definition of parentage for this purpose), the mean-
ing of ‘parent’ under the CRS is also unclear: does it mean the biological parent or birth
mother? At the time of the drafting of the CRS in 1961 – before the advent of assisted
reproductive technologies – the birth mother and biological parent were synonymous
concepts,44 so it is unclear whether the CRS can accommodate children born by surro-
gacy. However, we argue that a modern-day understanding of the term ‘parent’ could be
applied, in line with the object and purpose of the treaty,45 which is to reduce stateless-
ness,46 and the evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation, which provides that the
meaning of a term in a treaty is capable of changing over time.47
The second, and arguably most significant, problem is that only states that have
consented to be bound to the CRS are indeed bound by it. At the time of writing, the
CRS has only 65 States Parties of the 193 or so states in the world. Thus the above-
42. Ibid, Art 2(b).
43. The meaning of ‘parent’ is discussed below.
44. The first baby born via in vitro fertilisation was Louise Brown, born in 1978; see A Eley
‘How has IVF developed since the first “test-tube baby”’? BBC News (23 July 2015), available
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-33599353 (accessed 11 February 2016).
45. 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Art 31(1).
46. Preamble, 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 UNTS 175. The pream-
ble forms part of the Convention’s context, in accordance with 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Art 31(2).
47. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Costa Rica v Nicaragua, Judgment,
ICJ Reports 2009, p 213, at [64].
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mentioned legal framework set out by the CRS is not applicable in most states – includ-
ing India, Cambodia, the USA and Thailand, states in which a significant amount of
children have been born as a result of international surrogacy agreements.48 This
lacuna of non-participation is anticipated by the CRS in Art 4, which provides that a
Contracting State will grant its nationality to a person born in the territory of a non-
Contracting State, if the nationality of one of that child’s parents was of that Contracting
State. Putting aside the definitional issues surrounding who is deemed a ‘parent’, further
questions are raised by Art 4. What if the child is born in a non-Contracting State, and
both of that child’s intended parents are from a non-Contracting State? This is the most
likely scenario, as the majority of states in the world are indeed non-Contracting
States.49 In such a scenario, the CRS would have no applicability whatsoever and
the child would be rendered stateless. Thus the problem identified in the first half of this
paper is not necessarily solved by application of the CRS.
Even if the CRS were applicable, problems still arise in terms of enforcement.
Although individuals may enforce their rights under the CRS at a domestic level by
virtue of the relevant legislation that incorporates the CRS rights into domestic law,
there is little, if any, recourse on the international level for those who feel that the
CRS has not been applied correctly, or has not been applied at all. This is due to a
general lack of standing of individuals in the international judicial system, and due to
the fact that the CRS does not provide for an individual complaints mechanism.
Generally speaking, states are often reluctant or unable to hold other states accountable
for denial of nationality, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) –
which has a mandate for the assistance of stateless persons since 1974 – does not have
a mandate to declare the denial of nationality illegal.50
In light of the abovementioned problems, it is necessary to determine whether there
are other provisions of Public International Law that would protect international surro-
gate children who are born stateless. Article 24(3) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) stipulates a child’s right to be registered after
birth and to acquire a nationality.51 The ICCPR has significantly more State Parties
than the CRS – 168 at the time of writing – yet, similar to Art 15 of the UDHR, Art
24 of the ICCPR does not identify which state is obliged to grant nationality, nor under
what circumstances nationality should be granted. In addition, in General Comment 17,
the Human Rights Committee stated that Art 24(3) ‘does not necessarily make it an
obligation for States to give their nationality to every child born in their territory’.52
48. Ukraine is party to the Convention as of 25 March 2013. It is unclear whether the numbers
of international surrogate children born in India and Thailand will reduce following the recent
criminalisation of international surrogacy arrangements in these jurisdictions.
49. There does not seem to be significant state practice or opinio juris to the effect that Art 4
represents customary international law. Therefore Art 4 is only binding on States Parties to the
CRS.
50. UNGA Res 3274 [XXIX] [10 December 1974]; UNGA Res 31/36 [30 November 1976].
51. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171.
52. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ‘General comment no. 17: rights of the
child (Art. 24): 07/04/89’, at [8]. During the course of drafting, the original proposal of Art 24(3)
provided that ‘The child shall be entitled from his birth to … a nationality.’ During the ensuing
debate, the word ‘acquire’ was inserted and the words ‘from his birth’ were deleted. According
to Detrick, these amendments were made because the majority felt that a state could not assume
an unqualified obligation to afford its nationality to every child born on its territory regardless of
the circumstances.
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Accordingly, the right in Art 24 is not to be considered a right of the individual, but was
accorded by the state at its discretion.53 However, the Human Rights Committee has
urged states to enforce Art 24(3) in a meaningful manner, for example, in its
comments on Ecuador, Colombia and Zimbabwe.54
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the most widely ratified
international treaty.55 The CRC deals with the rights of children generally and not
stateless children specifically, but six provisions (Arts 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10) within the
CRC are nonetheless relevant to stateless children born by international surrogacy
agreements.56 The first, most important, aspect of the CRC is its applicability. Article
2 sets out that States Parties only have an obligation towards children within their
jurisdiction.57 However, this does not mean that the CRC does not have extraterritorial
application. The drafting history of the CRC reveals that the original proposal of Art 2
referred to ‘all children in their territories’ and thus the replacement of this terminol-
ogy strongly indicates that the CRC does not apply exclusively on a territorial ba-
sis.58 Many of the provisions in the CRC have international aspects, such as those
dealing with custody and access (Art 10), adoption (Art 21) and refugees (Art
22).59 More generally, there is significant international jurisprudence indicating that
a treaty can be applicable where a state acts extraterritorially.60
Article 3 provides that in all actions concerning children, the ‘best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration’. Such actions would, of course, include applica-
tions on behalf of a child for the granting of nationality. More specific to the problem
identified by this paper, Art 7 provides that:
The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from
birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
know and be cared for by his or her parents.
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their
national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this
field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
Read in conjunctionwithArt 2 (which provides that it is the state inwhose jurisdiction the
child is has the obligation to implement the CRC), the obligation in Art 7 is thus primarily
addressed to the state in which the child is born. However, as the right is ‘to acquire’ a
nationality, the same considerations regarding Art 24 of the ICCPR apply; that is, that
there may be an element of state discretion involved in the bestowal of nationality. It is
difficult to reconcile this with the words ‘shall ensure’ in the second part of Art 3, which
53. S Detrick A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999) p 150.
54. (1998) UNDoc CCPR/C/79/Add 92; (1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add 76; (1998) UNDoc
CCPR/C/79/Add 89.
55. 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3. The USA and Somalia are the
only UN members that are not States Parties to the CRC.
56. DHodgson ‘The international legal protection of the child’s right to a legal identity and the
problem of statelessness’ (1997) 7 Int’l J L & Fam 255; JE Doek ‘The CRC and the right to ac-
quire and to preserve a nationality’ (2006) 25(3) Refugee Surv Q 26.
57. 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3, Art 2; Detrick, above n 53, p 69.
58. UN Doc E/CN.4/1349, p 3.
59. Detrick, above n 53, p 71.
60. See eg Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, application no 27021/08, 7 July 2011;Hirsi Jamaa and
Others v Italy, application no 27765/09, 23 February 2012.
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entail an obligation of result.61 This means that the state in which the child is born must
successfully implement the right to acquire a nationality. The CRC does not specifically
say the nationality granted should be the nationality of that state specifically; however,
we argue that in line with the object and purpose of the treaty (which is to protect the
rights of the child)62 and the principle of effectiveness,63 the State Party in which
the child is born has at the very least an obligation to grant nationality where the child
would otherwise be rendered stateless.
In addition, Art 8 of the CRC provides that the State Party has a continuing obligation
to preserve the child’s identity, which includes their nationality, name and family
relations, and Art 9 provides that as a general rule, a child shall not be separated from
his/her parents against their will. Thus where a child is awaiting determination of
nationality, it can be argued that the state has an obligation not to expel his/her par-
ent(s). This is supported by Art 10, which provides that applications by a child or
his/her parents to enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification shall
be dealt with in a positive, humane and expeditious manner; and Art 3, which provides
that the best interests of the child are paramount. Clearly, being accompanied by their
intended parents in the best interests of a newborn child. However, similar to the CRS,
the term ‘parent’ is undefined by the CRC.
Finally, it should be noted that Optional Protocol III to the CRC, which provides for
an individual complaints mechanism,64 entered into force in April 2014.65 It currently
has 26 States Parties, although the Committee has yet to deliver its views on any
complaint received.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not explicitly refer to
nationality rights.66 However, Art 8(1) provides that ‘everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life’. The relationship between this paper and international
surrogacy agreements was examined in the recent cases of Labassee v France and
Menneson v France.67 Both cases concerned a husband and wife who conducted
surrogacy arrangements in the USA, using the gametes of the husband and an egg from
the surrogate. The cases examined the refusal of the French authorities to legally
recognise the family tie between a child, his biological father and his intended mother;
and the ECtHR decided that the proceedings should be considered simultaneously.68 In
its judgment, the ECtHR said that a distinction was to be drawn between: (i) the
61. Detrick, above n 53, pp 68–69.
62. 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Art 31(1).
63. This principle provides that the objective of treaty interpretation is to advance the aims of
that treaty. See RK Gardiner Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p
190.
64. States can also submit a declaration pursuant to Art 12 that they recognise the competence
of the Committee to receive inter-state complaints.
65. UN General Assembly ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of a Child on a
Communications Procedure’ (19 December 2011).
66. 1955 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
213 UNTS 221.
67. Mennesson v France, application no 65192/11, 26 June 2014; Labassee v France, applica-
tion no 65941/11, 26 June 2014. See G Puppinck and C de La Hogue ‘ECHR: towards the
liberarisation of surrogacy’, English translation of an original study published in French in
(2004) 118 Revue Lamy de Droit Civil 78.
68. The child in question was not stateless; however, the concept of a ‘family link’ may be rel-
evant in future cases, where such a link must be established for the purposes of granting
nationality.
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applicants’ right to respect for their family life; and (ii) the right of the children to
respect for their private life. Regarding point (i), the ECtHR decided that because the
children were not prevented from living in France and because of the doctrine of margin
of appreciation,69 a fair balance had been struck between the interests of the parents and
those of the state. Regarding point (ii), the ECtHR said that although the ECHR does not
grant a right to nationality, nationality is an element of a person’s identity and it has
consequences for the enjoyment of other rights, in particular for inheritance rights.
The ECtHR accepted that France may wish to deter its nationals from going abroad
to undertake surrogacy agreements, but the effects of non-recognition of the children’s
relationship with a parent affects the children, whose right to private life was
substantially affected. The ECtHR therefore held in both cases that France’s refusal
to legally recognise both families constituted a violation of right to private life under
Art 8 ECHR.
To draw this decision back to the question posed in this paper, it appears that the
ECtHR was willing to interpret Art 8 of the Convention broadly to find an obligation
to recognise a family link between the intended mother, the biological father and a child
born outside a Contracting State by an international surrogacy agreement. In future
cases, this decision may be relevant for establishing nationality, particularly given
the reference in the case to nationality forming part of a person’s identity. Indeed, there
is some evidence of the influence of this reasoning in recent domestic cases relating to
surrogacy, especially in states that previously adopted a restrictive approach.70 The
HCCH has stated that Mennesson and Labasse have had an impact, and argue that a
trend can, albeit cautiously, be discerned in recent cases in favour of the broader
recognition of legal parentage following international surrogacy agreements under
certain conditions.71 However, a notable feature of Mennesson and Labasse was that
these children were present on French territory, which triggered France’s obligation
in this regard. Had the children concerned never entered France, the ECHR would
not apply. This is because Art 1 ECHR provides that it will only apply to persons within
the jurisdiction of the States Parties,72 and it is only in exceptional circumstances that a
decision of a state that has extraterritorial effects can be held as a violation of the
ECHR.73 Thus in order for Art 8 – and by extension, the above case-law – to be
applicable, the child concerned would need to be present in a Council of Europe
Member State to rely on the ECHR.74 As aforementioned, one of the first problems that
a stateless child often faces is entering the state of his intended parents; thus it is unclear
how much assistance this case will give in practical terms as, ipso facto, children born
69. This refers to space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national
authorities, in fulfilling their obligations under the ECtHR.
70. See generally, Hague Conference on Private International Law The Parentage/Surrogacy
Project: An Updating Note (February 2015), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
gap2015pd03a_en.pdf (accessed 11 February 2016) p 8.
71. Ibid. See the German Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 10 December 2014 (No XII ZB 463/
13), which held in favour for the recognition in Germany of a California judgment recognising
two intending fathers as the parents of a child born through surrogacy;
72. ‘Jurisdiction’ may also include acts carried out extraterritorially, but this is not relevant in
the context of this paper.
73. See eg Soering v United Kingdom, application no 14038/88, 7 July 1989.
74. The ECHRmay nevertheless provide protection to children born in the Ukraine and Russia,
where many ISAs are carried out.
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by virtue of international surrogacy agreements are born outside of the state of
nationality and/or residence of their intended parents.
The decisions of Labassee and Mennesson were followed by the decision of
Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy in 2015.75 In this case, Italy refused to transcribe
the birth certificate of a child born to a surrogate in Russia. When it emerged that the
intended father had no genetic link with the child (contrary to the information that
the intended parents had provided the authorities), the applicants were charged with
distorting the civil state, forging and violating the law on adoption. The child was
subsequently placed in care and the applicants were found to no longer have standing
in the adoption proceedings.
The ECtHR ruled that the applicants could not act on behalf of the child, who had a
guardian since October 2011. However, the ECtHR held that the decision to separate
the child from the intended parents amounted to a violation of the parents’ right to
family life as protected by Art 8 of the ECHR, as the child had been with the couple
for 6months and thus there existed a de facto family environment. The focus of the case
was therefore on the removal aspect, as the ECtHR found that the claim regarding the
transcription was inadmissible on account of the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic
remedies.
This judgment is of significance for stateless children born from international surro-
gacy agreements for the following reasons. First, in recognising that a de facto family
environment was created despite (i) a surrogacy contract that would be illegal in
Italy, (ii) false statements being made in respect of parentage and (iii) no genetic link
between the intended parents and the child, the ECtHR has significantly broadened
the decisions in Labassee and Mennesson. In this sense, the ECtHR does not address
questions of public policy (ie the desirability of surrogacy) or the morality of the actions
of the intended parents when determining whether a family relationship exists for the
purposes of Art 8. The ECtHR focuses only on the child’s/intended parents’ rights to
private and family life, concentrating on the de facto links between the intended parents
and the child. To apply this by analogy to stateless children born from international sur-
rogacy agreements, it could be argued that this decision has made it easier for intended
parents to show the necessary link to a stateless child for the purposes of applying for
nationality. In the words of Judges Raimondi and Spano, in their Separate Opinion:
[…] the position of the majority essentially denies the legitimate choice of states to
not recognise the effects of surrogacy arrangements. If creating an illegal link with
a child abroad is sufficient to create a ‘family life’, it is clear that the freedom of states
to not recognise the legal effects of surrogacy agreements, a freedom previously
recognised in the jurisprudence of this Court, is reduced to nothingness.76
Secondly, it may be recalled that in Labassee andMennesson, the Court was unwill-
ing to find that the parents’ Art 8 rights had been violated. By finding that the parents’
Art 8 rights had been violated, the Paradiso decision has broadened the scope of Art 8
in relation to international surrogacy agreements. The result is that the ECtHR has taken
a purposive approach to Art 8 that is in line with the approach put forward by this paper.
Put simply, although the banning surrogacy is a prerogative of the state, the human
rights of the child and of the parents is a separate human rights issue that is protected
by the ECHR.
75. Paradiso et Campanelli c Italie, application no 25358/12, 27 January 2015.
76. At [15]. This is the authors’ translation from the French judgment.
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Finally, although the decision in Paradiso recalled that the ECHR needs to be
interpreted in accordance with the principles of international law, it is regrettable that
the discussion of international law principles was limited to a brief mention of the
1961 Hague Convention Eliminating the Requirement of Legalisation of Foreign
Public Documents. Many of the conventions discussed in the previous section also
contain provisions that are particularly relevant to the facts in Paradiso. By analogy,
in future ECtHR cases involving statelessness, the ECtHR should follow the logic of
its position and take into account all the provisions discussed in this paper in its
interpretation of the ECHR.
4. IS A NEW CONVENTION THE BEST SOLUTION?
Most of the literature to date on international surrogacy agreements identifies the
problems that arise by virtue of these agreements and generally agrees with the position
of the HCCH that a new convention regulating international surrogacy agreements is
necessary.77 However, a new convention will simply not solve the problems outlined
by this paper. Intended parents usually participate in international surrogacy
agreements because commercial surrogacy is illegal in their own national jurisdiction.
Therefore states that have banned commercial surrogacy would have to ratify such a
convention in order for it to be successful; that is, so that the state of the intended parents
would be obliged to grant nationality to international surrogate children. We argue that
this simply is not going to happen. Even if states are willing to participate in the
convention, it could take years for the convention to enter into force. This was the case
for the 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families,78 which only entered into force 12 years after its initial
adoption by the General Assembly,79 and has been ratified by only 49 states.
Secondly, the negotiation of a new convention could take years, if not decades.
Negotiation on the proposed convention has not yet begun, as the HCCH is still in
the very early stages of preliminary research. Thirdly, there is no guarantee that a
convention will ever be completed. The discussion of statelessness and nationality in
this paper is but one of many controversial issues on which the drafters of the
Convention will have to find agreement. As any new Convention would necessitate
the drafting of a framework for legal parentage in the Convention, negotiating what
this would entail would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the
context of how international surrogacy agreements operate, and particularly, the
reasons why surrogates participate in such agreements occur in ‘highly differentiated
localities’80 throughout the world, where practices/motivations vary significantly. For
instance, in India, ethnographic studies have demonstrated that many of those who act
as egg donors and surrogates do so in order to relieve permanent or temporary
77. Ergas, above n 36; Trimmings and Beaumount, above n 20; Trimmings and Beaumount,
above n 36.
78. UNGeneral Assembly ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of their Families’ Res A/RES/45/158, 18 December 1990.
79. Human RightsWatch ‘Migrant workers need protection: UN treaty comes into force’, Press
Release (30 June 2003), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/06/30/migrant-workers-
need-protection (accessed 11 February 2016).
80. B Parry ‘Narratives of neoliberalism: “clinical labour” in context’ (2015) 14 Med Human
32 at 34, 37. See also L Dolezal ‘Considering pregnancy in commercial surrogacy: a response
to Bronwyn Parry’ (2015) 41(1) Med Human 38.
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indebtedness,81 and this may differ significantly from motivations of surrogates in
states such as the USA. Moreover, significant differences and inequalities may exist
in terms of intended parents and surrogates involved in international surrogacy agree-
ments.82 Any attempt to achieve a global consensus on the regulation of surrogacy,
such as in the form of an international convention, ‘must necessarily be informed by
detailed ethnographic research that elucidates the complex lived experience of clinical
labour in situ’83 and would need to ‘attend to the question of how power relations
within the neoliberal economy are shaped by longer histories of unevenness and geopo-
litical and social in equality’.84 Finally, no matter how comprehensive the negotiation
process is, there will inevitably be cases that will fall outside the parameters of the con-
vention. For these reasons, we argue that a realistic approach should be taken as to when
and if a convention will ever enter into force, and it needs to be borne in mind that a
convention will not prevent all instances of statelessness from surrogacy arising.
In the meantime, it is equally, if not more, important to focus on existing binding
provisions that regulate the bestowal of nationality for children born stateless pursuant
to international surrogacy agreements. This is because states cannot use provisions of
its domestic laws as an excuse for failing to carry out its international treaty
obligations.85 The CRC, which is the most widely ratified international treaty, offers
the most comprehensive protection in this respect, particularly when the provisions
on nationality and the principle of the ‘best interests of the child’ are read in conjunction
with each other. Moreover, increasing the number of States Parties to the CRS will have
a direct impact on reducing statelessness, as states usually undertake accession in
addition to other measures aimed at reducing statelessness, such as reforming national-
ity laws, conducting surveys of stateless populations and creating statelessness
determination procedures. In addition, encouraging accession can involve engagement
with a wide range of stakeholders at the national level, including politicians, govern-
ment officials, community organizations and civil-society groups.86 Such engagement
provides an ideal opportunity to lobby for change on behalf of children born stateless as
a result of international surrogacy agreements.
Moreover, it is notable that following the successful outcomes of Paradiso,
Mennesson and Labassee, a number of cases are pending before the ECtHR. This
includes Laborie et autres c. France (concerning the refusal of the French authorities
to transcribe Ukrainian birth certificates of children born through international
surrogacy agreements);87 and Foulon c. France88 and Bouvet et autres c. France (both
cases concerning the refusal of the French authorities to transcribe Indian birth
certificates of children born through international surrogacy agreements).89 Given
81. Parry, ibid, at 34, who also cites: M Cooper and C Waldby Clinical Labor: Tissue Donors
and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014); L
Boltanski and E Chiapello The New Spirit of Capitalism (London: Verso, 2005).
82. See eg A Pande ‘Transnational commercial surrogacy in India: gifts for global sisters?’
(2011) 23(5) Reprod Biomed Online 618–625; A Pande Wombs in Labor: Transnational Com-
mercial Surrogacy in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
83. Parry, above n 80, at 37.
84. Ibid.
85. 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331, Art 27.
86. UNHCR ‘Good practices paper: acceding to the UN Statelessness Conventions’ (2014).
87. Laborie c France, application no 44024/13, 16 January 2015.
88. Foulon c France, application no 9063/14, 24 January 2014.
89. Bouvet c France, application no 10410/14, 29 January 2014.
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the broad approach that the Court took in Paradiso, it is likely that the ECtHRwill find a
violation of Art 8 of the ECHR in the above cases. It remains to be seen whether the
ECtHR will use the principles of Public International Law as highlighted in this paper
to inform its rulings.
We also argue that lawyers should be encouraged to make Public International Law
arguments in domestic cases, while being mindful of the limits of those arguments as
outlined above. For states such as the Netherlands that have a monist legal system,
international law is directly applicable in the domestic legal system and thus the
arguments canvassed in this paper are similarly directly applicable in a domestic
court.90 For states such as the UK that operate a dualist legal system, the national
legislature must ‘transform’ the international obligation into a rule of national law,
and the national judge will then apply it as a rule of domestic law.91 However, a
domestic judge should interpret that domestic rule in accordance with its original source
as an international instrument. As was stated by Lord Hope of Craighead, with
reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention:92
The point is commonly made in regard to the Convention that it is not right to
construe its language with the same precision as one would if it had been an Act
of Parliament. The Convention is an international instrument […] its choice of
wording must be taken to have been the product of the inevitable process of
negotiation and compromise […] And the general rule is that international treaties
should, so far as possible, be construed uniformly by the national courts of all states.
This point also suggests that the best guide to the meaning of the words used in the
Convention is likely to be found by giving them a broad meaning in the light of the
purposes which the Convention was designed to serve.93
Finally, we agree with the argument put forward by Yasmine Ergas that the drafting
of any new convention should be informed by existing human rights obligations.94 The
ECJ held that human rights law limits Member States’ domestic conduct and the scope
of their international agreements.95 Similarly, the ICJ has held that even where a
particular lex specialis applies, its provisions are to be interpreted in view of human
rights law,96 and human rights norms continue to apply unless they have been
specifically suspended.97 Indeed, as aforementioned, the obligation to take into
90. E Denza ‘The relationship between international and national law’, in MD Evans (ed) In-
ternational Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2006) p 428.
91. Ibid, p 429.
92. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137.
93. Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37.
94. Ergas, ‘Thinking “through” human rights: the need for a human rights perspective with re-
spect to the regulation of cross-border reproductive surrogacy’, in Trimmings and Beaumont,
above n 20, pp 427–439 at p 430.
95. Joined cases C-402/05 P & C-4015/05 P, Yassar Abdulla Kadi& Al Bakaraat International
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account international law was explicitly stated in the ECtHR decision of Campenelli,
which dealt with the issue of international surrogacy agreements. Thus, it would in fact
be a breach of international law for a state to carry out obligations under a new
convention that conflicted with its existing human rights obligations, and therefore
the proposed convention would need to be in conformity with its existing obligations.
We advocate in particular for the inclusion of those set out in the CRC, as most states in
the world are a party to that Convention.
CONCLUSION
As identified above, the numbers of international surrogacy agreements are on the
increase globally. With no international legal framework and significant disparities
amongst national laws, children born as a result of international surrogacy agreements
are in a precarious position. In such circumstances, as seen above, states have generally
sought to achieve a temporary resolution, but these solutions are often ad hoc in nature
and can take considerable time and money to arrange.
It is simply not satisfactory, given the general agreement internationally on the need
to end statelessness, that children, who are one of the most vulnerable groups in society,
and whose human rights and dignity must therefore be given the utmost legal
protection, are born under the shadow of ‘statelessness’, with all the attendant risks this
position entails. Although the proposed Hague Convention on Surrogacy, if completed,
will address such issues, it is likely that it will take considerable time to conclude and
that states that ban commercial surrogacy will be reluctant to participate. A better
solution to the problems faced by international surrogacy agreement children is found
in the provisions governing statelessness in Public International Law. These provisions
– particularly those contained in the CRC and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR – offer
protection to international surrogacy agreement children, and such provisions should
be relied upon to interpret domestic legal provisions in litigation relating to
international surrogacy agreements. Finally, the drafting of any new convention should
be informed by existing international law obligations; particularly those set out in the
CRC, which is the most widely ratified treaty in the world.
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